Mind is usually described as the beginning of behavior (as in http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/mind ). For a naturalist who accepts the assumption that all events are caused by other events, the cause of behavior is traced back to the environment in which it takes place. There is no stopping point in this backtracking, but that is the function of the concept of mind. It functions in our thinking (and writing and speaking) as god does. Minds are like private little gods in each one of us. They are explanatory fictions. It is a relief to do without mind, and all other such concepts.

For me, mind, and words like self, consciousness and god, are concepts made up to explain observations although there is no evidence for them other than the observations they are said to explain. Thus, they don’t help. In fact, they hurt when we speak of them as causes, when our analysis ends with, or starts with, one of these concepts. Of course, it is possible to give an operational definition of an imaginary concept but this doesn’t mean it is useful or necessary. As Aristotle said of Plato and his world of ideal forms: you haven’t explained your explanation so you have gained nothing. And, of course, mind can simply be a metaphor, a way of talking about what we see, but we don’t leave it at that. In our intellectual tradition we give mind a causal role that isn’t merited by the underlying observations. Another of course: people have done fine work while speaking of it in terms of mind but this only means there are situations in which talking about mind doesn’t hurt, or hurts less. (There are many occasions when when more important issues are at stake and I do not object when hearing people speak of minds.)

Os

‘For the religious naturalist, environment replaces God, self and mind’.